Editorial: The populist wave by Little, Benjamin
4Editorial: the populist wave
Ben Little
O ne of the focuses of this issue is the rise of populism, and the question of how it might be embraced by the left - if indeed it should. This is clearly an important issue in a political terrain marked by Trump and Brexit. 
But the left also has to work out how to respond to opposition to Trump from 
business interests and other right-wing populists. I focus here on the tech industry 
in the US, which has been very interesting in its responses to Trump. There is no 
easy analogue to Silicon Valley in Europe: outposts of the same culture exist in cities 
like London and Berlin, but there is nothing to match the scale, wealth and power 
of the Valley anywhere this side of the Atlantic. However, the global reach of digital 
giants such as Facebook and Google, and the continued centrality of the US in world 
affairs, means that the ways in which the situation develops in the US will certainly 
have political implications for the rest of us. 
The significance of the industry has not been lost on the new administration. 
One of the first things that Trump did on winning the presidency was to call a 
meeting (on 14 December) of senior figures in Big Tech, in a conference room in 
Trump Tower. In the room were some of the most vocal opponents to his presidency, 
and to his platform, among the powerbrokers of American capitalism. Trump was 
deferential and flattering - ‘There’s no-one like you in the world’ - and, in an attempt 
at echoing the iconoclastic ideology of Silicon Valley, he insisted that there was no 
hierarchy in his administration. He told them that his door was open: he was ‘here 
to help [them] do well’. Elon Musk, who had previously said he’d move to China if 
Trump won, now joined the administration’s business advisory board, following his 
fellow PayPal founder (and Trump donor and advisor) Peter Thiel.
The bungled travel ban, however - which could be understood as resulting 
from Trump’s incompetence but also as a quick test of potential levels of resistance 
to the more illiberal parts of his platform - produced a clear and negative reaction 
from Silicon Valley. A letter signed by the vast majority of big tech firms, including 
Microsoft, Apple and Facebook, stated: ‘We are a nation made stronger by 
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immigrants’. Sergey Brin, President of Google’s parent company Alphabet (also a 
signatory to the letter) was spotted at an airport protest in San Francisco against the 
ban. Many of the letter’s signatories also offered their weight to legal challenges to 
the ban, in the form of a supporting briefing. After a short delay, even Musk allowed 
his companies Tesla and SpaceX to be added as signatories to the letter.
At the same time, a group of lesser known Valley investors offered to match 
public donations from their own pockets in an initiative to raise funds for the 
American Civil Liberties Union to oppose the ban. This was followed by a flurry of 
articles within tech media about the grassroots movements resisting Trump, often 
couched within the logic of start-up culture (a sort-of Darwinian, winner-takes-all 
logic best summarised by Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook’s favourite maxim ‘move fast 
and break things’). Not only are the tech industry providing funds and protecting 
their business interests, but now, it seems, they are also attempting to provide 
intellectual leadership in the popular resistance to Trump. 
Trump has rightly identified the tech industry as a critical industry for the 
success of his administration. But it could also make a fearsome opposition. With 
near unlimited funds, a honed PR machine and a presence in almost everyone’s 
pocket, Big Tech - and Trump’s relationship to it - will be a major shaper both of the 
administration and the resistance to it. 
It is important to remember here, however, that although Silicon Valley is 
frequently presented as an interest group, Big Tech is not a single homogeneous 
entity: it is both geographically and ideologically more spread than its common 
metonym normally implies, and it includes far more corporate types than software 
start-ups (albeit sometimes turned giant) and communications device manufacturers. 
Business models based on transcending state apparatuses (such as Apple or 
Amazon) rub up against corporations such as Tesla and Space X that are profoundly 
dependent on subsidies and good working relationships with state industries. Then 
there is a whole section of the industry that is involved in military technologies and 
surveillance, from robotics manufacturers Boston Dynamics (currently being sold-on 
by Alphabet) to Thiel’s Palantir data analytics security company. Indeed, the roots of 
the Valley lie in high-tech innovation for the military industrial complex. 
The struggle between Trump, Tech and ‘the Resistance’ will affect the future 
shape of capitalism and democracy. Will the Tech giants line up with the business 
interests for whom Trump’s protectionism and xenophobia make sense, based as 
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they are in the state-subsidised industries enmeshed in crony capitalism? Or will 
they try to shore up a globalised liberal capitalism, with an intensification of the 
shinier side of branded neoliberalism, ameliorative measures such as Basic Income 
(an increasingly popular idea among some technologists as new techniques of 
automation destroy jobs), and new drives towards the marketisation and datafication 
of everything? 
But what should the left do in either outcome? For Paolo Gerbaudo, the future 
lies in embracing a populism based on restoring sovereignty and control to nation 
states or groups of states (see his article in this issue). This would appear to make 
an alliance that includes liberal global capital problematic. On the other hand, 
Marina Prentoulis (see her contribution to ‘Alliances, fronts, parties and populism’) 
argues both that Syriza’s government coalition with the right-wing party ANEL was 
a shrewd strategic move, and that participating in alliances with people from very 
different political traditions often changes people’s politics in a progressive direction. 
The answer to the question of alliances surely must be based on what kinds of 
alliances we are discussing. Is opposing Trump so urgent that we need a cross-class 
alliance broadly similar to the popular fronts of the 1930s? Or should (can) the left 
focus on building a populist movement that can take on both liberal capitalism and 
the populist right?
The Bernie Sanders campaign is a good place to look for an understanding of 
what these alliances may mean. Guessing what would have happened if Sanders had 
won the nomination is to step into the fictions of alternative history: it is unclear 
whether he could have swung enough of the Trump voters in Rust Belt states and at 
the same time maintained the core Democrat liberal vote. Yet in terms of whether 
an alliance with Silicon Valley was considered worth the cost, this can be easily 
answered. Tech donors, albeit largely through lots of small donations, gave twice as 
much to Sanders in the primaries as to Clinton and Trump combined - and more 
than they had given to Obama by a similar point in 2008. And it is easy to draw a 
connection between this support and the Sanders campaign’s populist critique of 
capitalist excess, which focused on Wall Street and the institutions of global financial 
capital rather than Palo Alto’s digital imperialism. 
A left front in the US now has to consider whether it can maintain an alliance 
with the bits of Tech that already oppose Trump - with all the problems and 
advantages that brings - or whether it should adopt policies that might lose Tech’s 
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support and encourage a shift of patronage to an emollient Trump. A further 
question is whether, if the Valley really does want to seriously challenge Trump, they 
will even need or want an alliance with others. 
Seven out of ten of the richest people (predictably all white men) in America 
now come from the tech industry: they represent the greatest sectoral concentration 
of wealth in history; and they control what are probably the most important 
channels of communication (as well as designing the devices we use to access 
them). They have access to raw sources of data over which party campaign 
strategists would weep with joy. They largely practise a post-(Ayn)Randian messianic 
ideology where they believe they can shape the world in the image of their utopian 
imaginations. Given all this, why would they want an alliance that would force them 
to compromise their vision? Tech companies are not like ordinary corporations. 
They lack the separation of ownership and control that has been a key characteristic 
of traditional corporate apparatus. As with medieval kingdoms and their monarchs 
(and with other similar patriarchal structures), we can ask where Facebook ends 
and Mark Zuckerberg begins. This gives immense power to such figures - including 
potential political power.
Trump has changed the logic of American politics. An established public profile, 
outsider rhetoric and a big heap of money (though he claims to have turned a 
profit from his campaign) enabled him to make a successful run at the presidency 
despite the fierce opposition of the Republican establishment. A pathway to the 
highest office has now been demonstrated as a possibility for anyone with a resonant 
message, access to the media and the cash to fund a run. Silicon Valley has no 
shortage of people who can lay claim to that: reports suggest that Mark Zuckerberg 
has already adjusted the terms of his Facebook holdings to retain control of the 
company should he want to make a bid for office. On the other hand, the New 
Patriarchs of Big Tech may decide not to run themselves, but instead to deploy a 
proxy (Sheryl Sandberg has been mentioned), or to find a telegenic celebrity (George 
Clooney maybe?) with whom those elements of the industry unable to reconcile to 
Trump can work in open partnership. In the two-party system of American politics, 
there is a big question mark over what a populist left could really do in such a 
situation.
Big business interests have always been a significant, if not dominant, influence 
on American politics, but the firewall that has traditionally separated business 
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from party candidacy is now down (there is no need any more for a period of 
apprenticeship, as, for instance, in the case of Mitt Romney). We’re entering a world 
where the American presidency could become an extension of whatever corporate 
interest has the ability to outcompete the others. 
It is clear that we must stop Trump, but in doing so will we simply be shutting 
the door on one vain eccentric white man and his cronies, whose total wealth comes 
in at around $14 billion (see Matt Seaton’s article in this issue), only to open it for a 
pack worth a trillion?
About this issue
The first three features of this issue look at the much commented-upon recent 
rise of populism. Matt Seaton analyses the specifically American nature of Trump’s 
populism; our discussion looking at popular fronts and other kinds of alliances 
takes a more European look at the subject; while Paolo Gerbaudo makes the case 
for populism as the dominant political narrative of the contemporary era. There is 
agreement here that populism can be a left-wing phenomenon as well as right, and 
that populism is a legitimate political discourse - not an outsider phenomenon to be 
ejected from mainstream; and there is also a shared concern that so few people make 
any serious effort to define or understand populism, or to locate it within a specific 
historical set of circumstances. There is also agreement that right-wing populism 
needs to be vigorously resisted. But not all contributors have the same take on 
left-wing populism. Our hope is that the three pieces, taken together, will stimulate 
serious thinking on how best to organise politically in the difficult contemporary 
political landscape.
That we need to take time to think seriously about current political trends is not 
in doubt, and this makes our new series, Soundings Critical Terms, extremely timely. 
The aim of the series is to explore and build on a range of theoretical resources 
that members of the Soundings editorial group have found helpful to their own 
understandings of politics. The first article, by series editors Deborah Grayson and 
Ben Little, offers a framing statement for the series as whole, and makes a strong case 
for the place of conjunctural writing at the heart of the project.
Stuart Hall, one of the three founding editors of Soundings, was someone whose 
political writing, over a period of many years, provided immensely valuable ideas 
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and analysis for people who seek to change the world as well as interpret it. As a 
complement to Deborah and Ben’s series introduction, we are therefore including 
here edited extracts from the introductory material to the newly published edition of 
Stuart’s Selected Political Writings, as these set out some of his main contributions to 
political thinking.
Victoria Lawson and Sarah Elwood’s contribution to this issue, which is focused 
on ways of repoliticising poverty in the face of persistent attempts to naturalise it, 
and to explain it in terms of individual failing rather than a system that is predicated 
upon inequality, pays tribute to Doreen Massey’s work specifically because of its 
ability to shape generative ways of understanding political issues. 
Doreen’s work gave insights and starting points to a very wide range of thinkers, 
and in this issue we have collected together memories from some of them about the 
pleasures of thinking and working alongside Doreen.
In the anniversary year of the Russian revolution, Mike Makin-Waite discusses 
the political legacy of communism. His aim is to reflect on what went wrong (and 
occasionally right) as a way of informing decisions we make today. His particular 
focus is on democracy, and this includes both an analysis of how the repressive 
structures of state communism arose, and a discussion of the ways in which 
Gramscian communists sought to rethink communist oppositional practices within 
liberal democracies.
Our final article is the fourth instalment of our Soundings Futures series, which 
seeks to link a detailed critique of a particular aspect of neoliberal society to a set 
of proposals for an alternative socialist vision. Here Danny MacKinnon looks at the 
dismal record of regional policy in Britain, which, at least since the 1930s, has not 
comprehended that small amounts of ameliorative investment and political tinkering 
can make little headway in the context of a centralised system that is organised in 
a such a way that, as a matter of course, far more resources are channelled to the 
South East than to the rest of the country. Instead he proposes a regional policy 
that actively seeks to rethink the power relationship between different parts of the 
country, and to introduce forms of decentralisation that would enable industrial and 
economic policy to be coproduced between different levels: central government, the 
regions, cities and rural areas.
